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Abstract
In this paper we investigate some implications of recent results about salience on
loan decisions. Using the framework of focus-weighted utility we show that consumers
might take out loans even when that yield them negative utility. We claim, however,
that consumers are more prudent in their decisions and might be less likely to take out
such loans when the usual fixed- and increasing-installment plans are coupled with an
equivalent decreasing-installment option. We argue that harmful loan consumption,
especially in the case of loans with increasing-installments (e.g. alternative mortgage
loans), could be decreased if a policy would prescribe presentation of loan repayment
schedules in a way that employs this effect. Moreover, using the model of focus-
weighted utility we give a possible explanation for the unpopularity of decreasing-
installment plans, the success of increasing-installment plans and their higher default
rate observed during the recent financial crisis.
Keywords: focus weighted utility, loan decisions, welfare analysis
1 Introduction
Suppose you are about to purchase a laptop, worth $1000. A shop offers it with a loan
option which lets you to pay it off in two equal installments of $500 each. An other shop
offers you the same item with two different possible ways to pay for: either of two equal-size
installments of $500 each (same as the first shop’s offer), or a decreasing installments of
∗Department of Microeconomics, Corvinus University of Budapest and MTA-BCE „Lendület” Strategic
Interactions Research Group, Fővám tér 8, 1093 Budapest, Hungary, e-mail: barna.bako@uni-corvinus.hu
†Department of Applied Psychology, University of Vienna, Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien, Austria,
e-mail: linda.dezsoe@univie.ac.at
‡Department of Finance, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2, 5037 AB Tilburg, The Netherlands, e-mail:
g.neszveda@uvt.nl
1
$750 and $250, respectively. Assuming you would purchase the laptop at the first shop,
would you buy it at the second shop if you happened to see their offer first? Based on
the classical discounted utility model, rational decision-makers would consider the second
shop’s offer at least as good as the first’s one. That is, if one would choose to purchase the
item based on the first shop’s offer, she would definitely purchase it when she is faced with
the options offered by the second shop.
However, a growing body of evidence from laboratory and field experiments suggests
that this might not necessarily be the case. Provocative examples are presented for example
in Schkade and Kahneman (1998) or in Dunn et al. (2003). In these articles the authors find
strong support for the observation that decision-makers when faced with multi-dimensional
decisions tend to overweight few attributes of a decision relative to the others leading to
counterintuitive results.1
Disproportionate weighting of attributes has been intensely researched and the notion
recently was formalized for both risky decisions (Bordalo et al., 2012a) and intertemporal
choices (Kőszegi and Szeidl, 2013).2 The main assumption in these models is that people
tend to assign greater weight to the importance of an attribute in which their alternatives
differ more. These approaches have been successful in explaining a range of puzzling obser-
vations in different fields of economic decisions. More specifically, the model of Bordalo and
his colleagues can account for the decoy effect (Bordalo et al., 2013a), the endowment effect
(Bordalo et al., 2012b) the anchoring effect (Bordalo et al., 2014), provides an explanation
on how salience leads to a transformation of objective probabilities into probability weights
(Bordalo et al., 2012a) and explains several puzzles associated with asset prices (Bordalo et
al., 2013b). Furthermore, the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) explains time-inconsistent
behavior, both present bias and overcommitment to future goals at the same time, price
sensitivity in health decisions (Abaluck, 2011), loan financing without budget constraints
(Bertaut et al., 2009; Stango and Zinman, 2009) and lump-sum preferences compared to
annuity in retirement and health decisions (Brown et al., 2008).
While the model of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) shows obvious similarities to the one
presented in Bordalo et al. (2012a,b, 2013a,b, 2014) it assumes a weight function which is
not option-specific in contrast to the option-specific characterisation suggested by Bordalo
et al. and thus is more suitable to draw welfare conclusions and regulatory implications.
The model builds on a time-separable utility function where each attribute measures the
consumption in a given time period and welfare is defined as the sum of the utilities of
the respective consumption. In this framework the decision-maker maximizes her focus-
1More related examples can be found in Huber et al. (1982), Simonson (1989), Tversky and Simonson
(1993) or Roelofsma and Read (2000). For a detailed review of related experimental findings see for
example Camerer et al. (2004). More recently, Bertrand et al. (2010) presented field experiment evidence
about how context specific information changes the decision-maker’s behaviour.
2For earlier works on this literature see Tversky (1969), Tversky and Simonson (1993), González-Vallejo
et al. (1996), Roelofsma and Read (2000), González-Vallejo (2002), Scholten and Read (2010) or
González-Vallejo et al. (2012).
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weighted utility based on which the utility of a time period is weighted with a focus function.
This framework, however, does not specify the focus function in the presence of discounting
and such its applicability is somewhat limited in cases when time is an important factor of
the decision.
In this paper we extend this framework and present a model about loan decisions. To
make the framework suitable for analyzing intertemporal decisions we introduce discount-
ing and consider a more general case of the model of focusing. We analyze two different
specification of the focus function: decision-makers either focus on the nominal values or
on the discounted values of the utility. We show that a decision-maker’s disproportionate
focus on the initial benefit a loan entails (e.g. when receiving money or a purchased good)
can lead to decisions which yield negative utility.3 However, as we will show in this paper
this can be counterbalanced by introducing a specific alternative repayment schedule. In
particular, we claim that the introduction of a decreasing-installments plan in addition to
an existing fixed-installments plan makes the decision-maker less likely to take out loans
which would yield her negative utility. That is, adding well designed new alternatives to
the choice-set decreases the bias towards taking out harmful loans and as a consequence
increases welfare. This might have important implications for policy making regarding loan
consumption. We also find that even tough decreasing repayment plans have a positive
effect on loan decisions they are always dominated by fixed-installment plans. This result
is consistent with the empirical findings of Cox et al. (2014) that decreasing repayment
plans (e.g., equal principal repayment plan) are the least favored in the loan market when
other plans are also available to the consumers. Furthermore, we show that in some specific
cases the introduction of an increasing-installments plan can further increase the focusing
bias. This may explain why alternative mortgages had gained a large market share both in
the US and Europe (Demyanyk and Hemert, 2011; Cox et al., 2014). Based on this result
one may claim that the high focusing bias of increasing-installments plans may account for
the higher default rate among alternative mortgages.4 We argue that due to their strong
focusing bias such loans should be coupled with an equivalent decreasing repayment plan
to counterbalance the negative effect of the focusing bias, which otherwise may motivate
harmful loan consumption.
In what follows we present our model, derive its propositions and finally interpret our
results.
3This result is in line with the empirical observation that people tend to underestimate the burden of a
loan (Hoelzl et al., 2009; Akers, 2014).
4Mayer et al. (2009) findings suggest that the sharp increase of mortgage loans with initial low payments
followed by a period of higher payments, could be one of the main cause for the rise in mortgage defaults
in the late 2000s. As the authors show, a vast majority of these loans had become seriously delinquent,
especially after the initial low payment period had ended, and many cases eventually resulted in default.
Similar results are presented by Demyanyk and Hemert (2011) and Amromin et al. (2011).
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2 The Model
Let the consumption choice-set be given by a finite set C ⊂ RT+1, where T > 1. Adapt-
ing the framework of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) we assume that the consumer maximizes
her focus-weighted utility given by U(c) =
∑T
t=0 gtut(ct), where gt ≡ g(maxc ut(ct) −
minc ut(ct)) is a focus weight of period (attribute) t with g(·) a positive, strictly increasing
function. However, by consuming c = (c0, c1, . . . cT ) ∈ C the decision-maker realizes her
consumption-based utility of U(c) =
∑T
t=0 ut(ct).
In order to make the model more specific and relevant to intertemporal choices, we in-
troduce discounting and consider focus-weighted utility given by U(c) =
∑T
t=0 δ(t)gtut(ct),
with δ(t) ≡ δt as the common discount function, where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the per period dis-
count factor. Furthermore, we consider consumption-based utility or personal welfare as
U(c) =
∑T
t=0 δ
tut(ct). It is important to note that with this specification of the focus
weights the decision-maker’s focus is based on the nominal values rather than on discounted
values of the utilities. In section 3 we will show the consequences of the model when the
focus weights are defined on the discounted values.
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 ut(ct) = ct
Assumption 2 0 ∈ C
Assumption 3 (L,−x, . . . ,−x) ∈ C
These assumptions are not restricting the explanatory power of the model in any relevant
case. As it is shown by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) the model remains valid for any arbitrary
functional form of the focus function. By assuming linear utility functions we follow the
literature in this regard and assume that the utility function is a money metric measure.
Furthermore, we assume that the loan free status-quo is always in the choice-set, that is, not
taking out a loan is always an option for the decision-maker. Since the fixed-installments
plan is the most typical observed loan in practice we assume that the flat plan as a possible
repayment plan is always available in the choice-set.
Now, consider the following two consumption profiles: cA = (L,−x,−x, . . . ,−x) where
L, x ≥ 0 and c0 = (0, 0, 0, . . . , 0). One can think of cA as a loan with fixed-installments
(i.e., flat plan or annuity) and c0 as the loan-free status-quo.5
Based on the aforementioned framework, a consumer is going to choose cA instead of
c0, whenever U(cA) ≥ U(c0), i.e when:
g(L)L−
T∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ 0 (1)
5Notice that we do not restrict our analysis to the case of fair loans only. Throughout the analysis a loan
is considered in the most general way as a consumption profile, which can yield negative or non-negative
utility to the consumer.
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Note, however, that consuming cA could lead to a negative consumption utility, while
(1) is still satisfied. To illustrate that this might be the case, consider the following example.
Example 1 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9 and gt = maxc ut(ct) − minc ut(ct), with cA and c0 as
follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
gt = maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 600 600 600
In this case the consumer chooses cA, since U(cA) = 1000 · 1000 − 0.9 · 600 · 600 − 0.92 ·
600 · 600− 0.93 · 600 · 600 = 121960 > 0, however, cA yields a consumption-based utility of
U(cA) = 1000− 0.9 · 600− 0.92 · 600− 0.93 · 600 = −463.4 < 0. Hence, a consumer focusing
on the closer-to-the-present attributes may be tempted to choose a consumption profile which
yields a negative utility for her.
Assumption 4 xt < L for t = 1, . . . , T
We assume that all installments are strictly smaller than the lump-sum value, that is, we
assume that a loan is always paid back in several installments.
Definition 1 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the fair lump-sum value
(LW ) is the value for which the consumption-based utility of the loan is zero, i.e., u0(LW )+∑T
t=1 δ
tut(ct) = 0.
Definition 2 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the fair focus-weighted
utility lump-sum value (LFWU ) is the value for which the focus-weighted utility of the loan
is zero, i.e., g(LFWU )u0(LFWU ) +
∑T
t=1 δ
tgtut(ct) = 0.
Proposition 1 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the decision-maker is
always willing to accept a lower lump-sum value based on her focus-weighted utility than
based on her consumption utility, i.e. LFWU < LW .
Proof: Since gtg(LFWU ) ∈ (0, 1) we have that
T∑
t=1
δt
gt
g(LFWU )
ut(ct) >
T∑
t=1
δtut(ct)
or LFWU < LW 
This proposition indicates that it is always possible to create a loan contract which
seems to be beneficial for the decision-maker even though it yields negative utility for her.
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Definition 3 For a given c repayment plan and discount factor the focusing bias in loan
decisions (B) is the difference between the fair lump-sum values, i.e., B = LW − LFWU
To examine the effects of focusing, let us introduce one more consumption profile: cB =
(L,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xT ), where xi ≤ xj whenever i ≥ j and xt ≥ 0, (i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} and
t = 1, 2, . . . , T ). We assume that
∑T
t=1 δ
txt =
∑T
t=1 δ
tx, where x refers to the installments
of cA.6 One can think of cB as a decreasing loan repayment plan with a present value equal
as cA. In this case, the consumer’s maximization problem can be written as:
max
c
U(c) for c ∈ {c0, cA, cB}. (2)
Proposition 2 Introducing a decreasing loan repayment plan in addition to a flat repay-
ment plan decreases the focus-weighted utility of the flat plan.
Proof: Let k ≡ min{i|xi ≤ x}. If x1 ≥ x and xT ≤ x, then k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T} is well
defined, as it is the case for loan repayment plans. We shall prove that:
g(L)L−
T∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ g(L)L−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x−
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x
−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x)x ≥ −
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x
which is equivalent to
k−1∑
t=1
δt[g(xt)− g(x)]x ≥ 0 (3)
Since g(·) is a positive, strictly increasing function and δ > 0, this inequality holds if
x1, . . . , xk−1 ≥ x, which is the case by definition. 
Remark 1 Notice that Proposition 2 holds not only when a decreasing installments plan is
introduced, but also when any other type of loan repayment plan is added to the choice-set in
addition to the flat plan. This is because in the periods when the flat installment is greater
then the alternative one the actual focus will be determined by the flat plan and hence can
be eliminated, while in those periods when the installment of the alternative plan is higher
6Notice, that we do not restrict our attention to alternatives with the same duration as the original plan.
Throughout the analysis we allow alternative repayment plans to have shorter duration than the flat plan
as far as their present value is the same. In this regard, periods with no installments should be considered
as periods with xt = 0.
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relative to the flat installment than the assigned focus is also going to be greater. Thus,
inequality (3) holds for any type of equivalent repayment plan. Furthermore, with a similar
argument one can easily show that the same is true if the loan originally is offered with an
increasing-installments plan rather than with a flat plan.
Proposition 2 yields an interesting result. If the consumer’s profile-set consists only of
cA and c0, she chooses cA, whenever (1) is satisfied. Yet, if cB is part of the set as well,
she may prefer c0. To demonstrate this, consider the next example.
Example 2 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9 and gt = maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) again and the consump-
tion profiles as follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
cB 1000 -780 -670 -300
gt = maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 780 670 600
In this case U(cA) = 1000 ·1000−0.9 ·780 ·600−0.92 ·670 ·600−0.93 ·600 ·600 = −9260 < 0,
U(c0) = 0 and U(cB) = 1000 · 1000 − 0.9 · 780 · 780 − 0.92 · 670 · 670 − 0.93 · 600 · 300 =
−42389 < 0. Therefore the optimal choice is c0.
Furthermore:
Proposition 3 If C = {c0, cA, cB}, then cA  cB, i.e., if a flat and a decreasing plan are
both available to a consumer, then the former is always preferred.
Proof: We shall prove that:
g(L)L−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)x−
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x ≥ g(L)L−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(xt)xt −
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)xt (4)
Define yi ≡ xi − x. Note that yi ≥ 0 if i = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1 and yi ≤ 0 otherwise. Thus
(4) can be written as:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)x+
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)x ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)(x+ yt) +
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)(x+ yt)
This simplifies to:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(x)yt (5)
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or
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt + g(x)
T∑
t=k
δtyt (6)
Since
∑T
t=1 δ
tx =
∑T
t=1 δ
t(x + yt), we have that
∑T
t=1 δ
tyt = 0. Using this, (6) can be
written as:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(x+ yt)yt − g(x)
k−1∑
t=1
δtyt
that is
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δt[g(x+ yt)− g(x)]yt (7)
As yt > 0 for t = 1, 2, . . . , k−1 and g(·) is strictly positive and increasing by definition, this
inequality always holds. Moreover, the inequality is strict whenever ∃s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T − 1}
for which ys > 0, in other words when cA 6= cB. 
Remark 2 Proposition 3 holds even if cB is not a decreasing but any other type of loan
repayment plan. In this case, inequality (6) can be rewritten as 0 ≤ ∑t∈K δtg(x + yt)yt +
g(x)
∑
t/∈K δ
tyt, where K is the set of indices for which the non-flat installment is higher
than the respective repayment of the flat schedule.
Proposition 4 Introducing any type of repayment plan in addition to a fixed-installments
plan decreases the focusing bias B.
Proof: According to Proposition 2 introducing an alternative equivalent repayment plan
makes the fixed-installment plan less attractive and LFWU increases compared to the orig-
inal setting. Thus, by introducing a new repayment plan the LFWU is increasing while the
LW does not change. As a consequence, the focusing bias B decreases. 
Proposition 5 Introducing any number of repayment plans in addition to a fixed-install-
ments plan decreases the focusing bias B.
Proof: Let the set of those periods in which at least one of the alternative repayment
plans’ relevant installment is greater than the fixed installment be K, i.e., K ≡ {t|xt >
x for any c ∈ C}. Since the focus weights in these periods are determined by the maximum
effective installments, it follows that these are bigger that the weights effective when only
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the flat plan is available. However, in those periods, when the installment of any alternative
plan is equal or smaller then the fixed installment the focus weight is determined by the
fixed installment. More formally, gt = g(maxc xt) if t ∈ K and gt = g(x) otherwise.
Counterposing the two focus-weighted utility of the flat plan, we can eliminate all those
periods’ utilities where the focus weight is similar, i.e., when t ∈ T \ K. The remaining
periods are all characterized by greater focus weights than the weights effective when only
the flat plan is available, since gt(·) = g(maxc xt) > g(x) if t ∈ K by definition. It follows
that the focus-weighted utility of the flat plan is smaller when the flat plan is coupled with
alternative repayment plans relative to the case when it is the only available repayment
plan. In other words, coupling the flat plan with alternative repayment plans decreases the
LFWU of the flat plan. Thus, if it happens that the consumer prefers the flat plan over all
the alternatives then the focusing bias B is decreasing following the introduction of new
repayment plans.
If, however, at least one alternative dominates the flat plan the consumer would prefer
to choose the loan with an alternative repayment rather than with the fixed-installments
plan. Let the set of alternatives with the highest focus-weighted utility given that all
alternatives are available be D. More formally, let D = {d ∈ C|d % c, ∀c ∈ C}. Take an
element of this set, say d˜. We know that the LFWU of d˜ is strictly greater than the LFWU
of the fixed-installments plan when there are only these two repayment plans available in
addition to the status-quo. We also know that the LFWU of d˜ is getting greater as new
alternatives are added to the choice-set, since the effective focus weights are never getting
smaller but potentially greater with the introduction of new repayment plans. However,
since the consumer prefers d˜ over any other repayment plans, the LFWU of d˜ should be the
lowest when all alternatives are available. Yet, as we have shown, this later LFWU is greater
than the LFWU of the fixed-installments plan when the choice-set consist only of these two
repayment plans apart from the status-quo. Consequently, the LFWU of d˜ is always higher
than LFWU of the fixed-installments plan in the original setting. Since we have chosen
d arbitrarily it follows that the argument holds for all d ∈ D. As a consequence, the
introduction of new repayment plans decreases the focusing bias B. 
3 Focus weights based on discounted values
So far, we considered cases with focus weights based on nominal values of the repayment
plans. Let us now examine our results when focusing is based on discounted values, that is,
when gt ≡ g(δt(maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct))). In the following we will show that if we define
focus weights in terms of discounted values Proposition 2 to 5 still hold for decreasing-
installment plans, although not necessarily for other alternative plans such as increasing-
installment plans.
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Proposition 6 When the decision-maker focuses on the discounted values of the utilities,
introducing a decreasing loan repayment schedule makes a flat plan less attractive for the
consumer.
Proof: In this case (3) changes to:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δtxt)x−
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δtx)x ≥ 0 (8)
Since x1, . . . , xk−1 ≥ x, g(·) positive and strictly increasing, while δ ∈ (0, 1] this inequality
always holds. 
Remark 3 Note that Proposition 6 holds not only for decreasing plans but for any other
type of loan repayment schedule. Moreover, the same is true for an increasing-installments
plan when it is coupled with new alternatives. To see this, one can use the same technic
presented in Remark 1.
Proposition 7 When the decision-maker focuses on the discounted values and C =
{c0, cA, cB} then cA  cB, i.e., if a flat and a decreasing plan are both available to a
consumer, then the former is always preferred.
Proof: In this case (5) can be written as:
0 ≤
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(δtx)yt (9)
Notice that
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δtx)yt is always negative, since yt < 0 for any t = k, . . . , T . That is,
by replacing δt with δk for each t = k, . . . , T , we have that the right-hand side of (9) is
never lower than
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δkx)yt. Hence:
k−1∑
t=1
δtg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
T∑
t=k
δtg(δtx)yt ≥
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+ yt))yt +
∑T
t=k δ
tg(δkx)yt (10)
The right-hand side of (10) can be written as
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x + yt))yt + g(δ
kx)
∑T
t=k δ
tyt
and since
∑T
t=1 δ
tyt = 0, this equals to
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x + yt))yt + g(δ
kx)
∑k−1
t=1 −δtyt or∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δt(x+yt))yt−
∑k−1
t=1 δ
tg(δkx)yt This, however, can be written as
∑k−1
t=1 δ
t[g(δt(x+
yt)) − g(δkx)]yt As y1, . . . , yk−1 ≥ 0 and g(·) is positive and strictly increasing, this latter
expression is always non-negative, that is, (10) always holds, and as a consequence (9) is
always true. 
Proposition 7 is not necessarily true if cB is not a decreasing repayment plan, but for
instance, an increasing one. To illustrate this consider the following example.
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Example 3 Let T = 3, δ = 0.9, gt = δt[maxc ut(ct) − minc ut(ct)] and the consumption
profiles be as follows:
0. 1. 2. 3.
cA 1000 -600 -600 -600
c0 0 0 0 0
cC 1000 -542 -602 -669
maxc ut(ct)−minc ut(ct) 1000 600 602 669
gt 1000 540 487.62 487.7
In this case U(cA) = 1000·1000−0.9·540·600−0.92·487.62·600−0.93·487.7·600 = 258096.26,
U(c0) = 0 and U(cC) = 1000 · 1000− 0.9 · 540 · 542− 0.92 · 487.62 · 602− 0.93 · 487.7 · 669 =
260962.47. Therefore the optimal choice is cC.
We summarize this in the following
Proposition 8 In case of focusing on discounted values the welfare effect of introducing a
repayment plan is ambiguous, however, introducing a decreasing repayment plan still pro-
vides welfare improvement.
Remark 4 Notice that for the propositions to hold we don’t need a real decreasing-install-
ments plan in the sense that xi ≥ xj whenever i ≥ j, we only need a repayment plan with
a k for which xi > x if i < k and xi ≤ x, otherwise.
4 Discussion
Our propositions in both specifications suggest that introducing a new repayment plan
increases the LFWU of a flat plan. One might argue that this may possibly deter the
decision-maker from taking out a loan which could result in positive consumption utility.
This, however, cannot be the case. Whenever the consumption utility of a loan is positive
the focus-weighted utility of it is also positive.
Remark 5 If U(c) > 0, then U(c) > 0 also holds. To show this consider the following.
The focus-weighted utility of c = (L,−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xT ) can be written as
g0L− δg1x1 − δ2g2x2 − · · · − gT δTxT
where gt is the focus weight for period t. Since xi < L (i = 1, . . . , T ), we have that g0 ≥ gt
for any t = 1, . . . , T . Thus
g0L−δg1x1−δ2g2x2−· · ·−gT δTxT ≥ g0L−δg0x1−δ2g0x2−· · ·−g0δTxT = g0(L−
T∑
t=1
δtxt)
Yet, this is always positive, since U(c) > 0 and g0 > 0.
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Proposition 9 Our results remain valid in the case of quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Laib-
son, 1997).
Proof: Using βδ(t) instead of δ(t) the relevant expressions increase β-fold, where β ∈ (0, 1]
is the parameter for present bias. By dividing them with β > 0 we obtain exactly the same
inequalities we derived in the above given proofs. 
Independently from the specification of the focusing function, our results suggest that
introducing a decreasing repayment plan decreases the focusing bias. In other words, a loan
is always less attractive based on its focus-weighted utility compared to its consumption
utility when a new decreasing plan is introduced in addition to the original plan and as a
consequence the bias B = LW −LFWU decreases. We have also shown that the decrease of
the bias caused by the introduction of new repayment plans cannot deter the decision-maker
from taking out a loan with positive consumption utility. Moreover, introducing quasi-
hyperbolic discounting for modeling present biased behavior does not affect our results.
It is important, however, to investigate which of the specifications is more descriptive
for loan decisions. The main testable difference in implications is the attitude towards
increasing repayment plans. This is especially relevant nowadays because of the various
new types of mortgages. Interest-only mortgages and deferred amortization mortgages
could all be examples of different types of increasing repayment plans. These financial
innovations, however, have unclear impact on loan decisions and one might think that they
have a negative effect on the decision-maker’s judgment. According to some experimental
and empirical findings increasing repayment plans are less preferred by the decision-makers
than other types of repayment plans which suggests that the specification of focusing on
nominal values might be more adequate for loan decisions. For example, empirical findings
by Hoelzl et al. (2011) suggest that subjects prefer fixed-installment plans over increasing-
installment plans and this preference is robust both in presence and in absence of interest
rate. On the other hand, the popularity of alternative mortgages (see Mayer et al., 2009)
indicate that the model with focusing on discounted values might be more robust than
the one with nominal values.7 Furthermore, one may reason that the higher default rate
observed among those who had chosen increasing-installment plans (Amromin et al., 2011)
might be due to their stronger focusing bias. This again supports the specification with
focusing on discounted values.
7However, van Leeuwn and Bokeloh (2012) argue that the popularity of some specific increasing re-
payment plans (i.e., interest-only mortgages and deferred amortization mortgages) in different countries
might be only due to tax refund possibilities. This is also supported by the empirical findings of Cox et
al. (2014), who claim that in the Netherlands the increasing repayment plans were taken out by wealthier,
less risk averse and more financially literate people suggesting that these loans are not preferred due to
misperception, but for some other reasons.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have investigated the effects of focusing in the presence of discounting
considering two possible specifications. In the first case we defined the focus weights based
on nominal values of the attributes, while in the second one we defined the focus weights
on discounted values. In the first specification we have shown that any extension of the
choice-set may improve consumer welfare. In the second specification, however, it is possible
that an extension of the choice-set with increasing-installments plan may result in welfare
loss. However, it is important to emphasize that even in this case the introduction of a
decreasing-installments plan makes the focusing bias less powerful in distorting valuations
and loan decisions.
From a policy standpoint, one may wonder what the practical consequences of the
existence of focusing bias are. In this regard our results indicate that lenders may have
strong, intended or unintended, influence on borrowers’ decisions just by offering them
the loans with specific repayment plans. As we have shown, a loan presented with a re-
payment plan featured with great focusing bias may incentivize consumption of the loan
even if that could result in negative utility. This, however, could be counterbalanced by
the mechanism presented in this paper. Based on our results we conjecture that adding a
decreasing-installments plan to the choice-set would make the decision-makers less likely to
take out loans which yield them negative utility without affecting their attitude towards
the ones with positive utility. Yet, we argue that people would still prefer to choose the
fixed-installments plan from this extended choice-set. Moreover, we claim that by exploit-
ing the aforementioned effect of focus, people could make more deliberate loan decisions.
If banks, for example, would present a loan in fixed- and decreasing-installments options,
they could end up getting more prudent decisions from their clients. This obviously boils
down to policy making. Namely, a policy could prescribe that financial institutions present
a loan repayment schedule also in a decreasing-installment option, and not only in fixed-
or increasing-installment one. The induced focus on the decreasing-installments plan could
dampen the increased focus on getting the loan, thereby discouraging decision-makers from
taking out loans which might yield them negative utility. This may be especially impor-
tant in the case of loans with increasing-intallments plans (e.g. mortgages with initial
’teaser’ rates), since these instruments could generate the highest focusing bias, and as a
consequence, may motivate harmful loan consumption the most.
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